Paradigms of Political Power by John R Champlin

Author:John R Champlin [Champlin, John R]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Philosophy, Political Science, Political, General
ISBN: 9781351500920
Google: vpvxweiDxHQC
Goodreads: 35635122
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2017-07-05T00:00:00+00:00

NOTES

1. Power, pp. 10 ff. (London, 1938).

2. Professor Popper has made us aware of the importance of this side of the social sciences.

3. English translation, Power (Hutchinson’s, 1948).

4. Power and Personality (New York, 1948). See also Politics, Who Gets What, When, How? reprinted in The Political Writings of H. D. Lasswell (Glencoe, Ill., 1951).

5. Power and Society, H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Yale Law School Studies, Vol. II, 1950.

6. Allen and Unwin: London, 1930.

7. Dynamic Administration (London Management Publications Trust Ltd., 1934). The book is much better than the title suggests.

8. E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, V, p. 4, quoted by Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I, note to p. 106.

9. Cf. Mencius on the Mind, pp. 90 ff. (London, 1932).

10. The relation of the general heading of each type to its subheadings is not the same in all cases. I hope this may be indicated by the way I have worded each type.

11. Talleyrand, Mémoires, Vol. II, pp. 155–162. English translation, Vol. II, pp. 119 ff. Cf. Ferrero, The Principles of Power, p. 19 (English translation, New York, 1942).

12. Op cit., p. 290.

13. Op. cit., p. 144.

14. The terms “the Credenda and Miranda of Power” are taken from the all-too-short chapter in C. E. Merriam’s book Political Power (New York, 1934) where Professor Merriam discusses different ways in which symbols help to maintain faith in and respect for a political system.

15. Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III; Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 753 ff. (Tübingen, 1925).

16. Cf. Hohfeld, Fundamental Juridical Conceptions (Yale, 1919).

17. J. P. Plamenatz in his contribution to the Symposium “Rights” in the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. XXV (pp. 75 ff.) seems to me not to make this distinction clear. In withdrawing an earlier attempt (in Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation) to define a right as “a power which a creature ought to possess,” he says “When there’s nothing to prevent a man doing what he wants, he is said to have the power to do it; but he can be prevented from doing what he has a right to do. In that case he hasn’t the power where he has the right, and his right is therefore not a power. It is possible to talk of a power that a man ought to possess, but that, too, is a clumsy and misleading expression. There are things that men want to do but can’t do even when they are not prevented by other people.” This is to confuse power of my Type I (a) (physical capacity as causally efficacious) with power of my Type V (legal capacity). A man can, for instance, tell a trespasser to leave his property, but he may not assault him in order to remove him.

18. An analogous problem in connection with the interpretation of some concepts in law is considered by Professor Max Gluckman in the chapter called “The Paradox of the ‘Uncertainty’ of Legal Concepts and the ‘Certainty’ of Law,” in The Judicial Process among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester University Press: forthcoming).

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